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Risk and Reliability Analysis Tool Development for Ship Machinery 
Maintenance 
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Concerning the successful business competence, strate-
gic planning should be enhanced considering assets 
availability by involving maintenance and reliability op-
erational aspects. The INCASS (Inspection Capabilities 
for Enhanced Ship Safety) FP7 EU funded research pro-
ject aims to tackle the issue of ship inspection, identifica-
tion of high-risk ships, providing access to information 
related to ship surveys and incorporate enhanced and 
harmonized cooperation of maritime stakeholders in or-
der to avoid ship accidents, promote maritime safety and 
protect the environment. The current research consists of 
machinery and equipment specifications and stakehold-
ers’ data requirements. Focusing on the methodology 
perspective, a Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) model is 
introduced. All progress and methodology development 
takes place in Java programming language. Overall, the 
outcomes of this study demonstrate the reliability perfor-
mance of marine machinery components. Future devel-
opment include dynamic failure rate variation through 
time, probabilistic model’s sensitivity analysis and com-
ponents’ and systems’ interdependencies in a user-
friendly Graphical User Interface (GUI) design. 
Keywords 
Maintenance; reliability; condition monitoring; probabil-
ity; machinery, Java programming. 
1. Introduction 
The business effectiveness and efficiency are influenced 
by factors such as time, financial restraints, technology 
and innovation, quality, reliability and information man-
agement (Madu, 2000). With the intention of competing 
successfully, companies should enhance their inspection, 
maintenance and reliability systems, which need to be 
considered during the organizations strategic planning. 
In this respect, several definitions are provided for both 
maintenance and reliability terms by various authors 
summarizing the notion that maintenance is a set of tech-
nical, administrative and managerial actions targeting to 
retain or restore the state of a system to function as re-
quired (Mobley et al., 2008). Furthermore nowadays, 
maintenance is encountered as an operational method, 
which can be employed both as a profit generating pro-
cess and a cost reduction budget center through an en-
hanced Operation and Maintenance (O&M) strategy. 
Hence, this paper aims to present the Research and De-
velopment (R&D) of the Machinery Risk Analysis 
(MRA) methodology as suggested by INCASS (Inspec-
tion Capabilities for Enhanced Ship Safety) FP7 EU 
funded project. First of all, Section 1 introduces the pa-
pers scope and motivation of research. Section 2 refers 
to Research Background which involves the exploration 
of Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) methodology 
and well known Condition Monitoring (CM) technolo-
gies and tools. In Section 3 is presented the suggested 
Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) methodology. Section 
4 demonstrates the MRA case study, followed by Section 
5 that the results of the case study are presented. In Sec-
tion 6 are discussed the results and future work for the 
MRA development. Whereas, Section 7 concludes the re-
search findings. 
2. Research Background 
From business viewpoint in shipping industry, mainte-
nance structure is transformed from budget gain perspec-
tive to investment for continuous and reliable asset ser-
vice. Whereas from operational standpoint, it is restruc-
tured from reactive to proactive actions, involving more 
control and information of the considered machinery and 
equipment. This section briefly explores the need for au-
tomated maintenance control and minimization of human 
involvement in maintenance actions where operational 
conditions allow that. Moreover, the latest CBM method-
ology and CM techniques and tools are presented by in-
troducing the latest notion of multi-component CM. The 
presented technologies and tools are evaluated and the 
selected ones will be implemented in the proposed IN-
CASS MRA methodology. 
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2.1 Human Error and Maintenance Control 
Automated inspection and maintenance methodologies 
are developed aiming to achieve higher level of availa-
bility and reliability by reducing operational costs and 
risk of damage due to human error. A literature review 
by Dhillon and Liu (2006) focusing on human error im-
pact on applications of maintenance highlights that a 
large amount of human errors take place during mainte-
nance operations. 
Asadzadeh and Azadeh (2014) propose an integrated sys-
temic model for the incorporation of human reliability 
model with CBM optimization. The functional resonance 
concept examines human-induced failure scenarios 
emergent from erroneous functional dependencies. On 
the other hand, Abbassi et al. (2015) present an integrated 
method for Human Error Probability (HEP) assessment 
during the maintenance of offshore facilities. They com-
bined the Success Likelihood Index Methods (SLIM) 
with the Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP). Additionally, Noroozi et al. (2013) demon-
strate the key role of human error in risk analysis by de-
veloping an application to pre-and post-pump mainte-
nance operations. As it can be seen, the most recent re-
search presents the tendency to control human error in 
inspection and maintenance procedures. Moreover, Prob-
abilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are developed 
by considering human error scenarios for specific occa-
sions. Thus, the need for computerized CM methodolo-
gies appears, which will tend to minimize unnecessary 
humans involvement during acceptable operational ma-
chinery conditions. 
2.2 Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
Previous research studies show that proactive mainte-
nance strategies are developed by employing various 
tools. A predictive maintenance strategy utilizing Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is presented by Lazakis et al. 
(2010). The model aims to upgrade the existing ship 
maintenance regime to an overall strategy including tech-
nological advances and Decision Support System (DSS) 
by combining existing ship operational and maintenance 
tasks with the advances stemming from new applied tech-
niques. CBM is the latest and under continuous develop-
ment methodology. The scope of CBM, which includes 
fault diagnosis and prognosis, is related to the detection 
of upcoming failures before they occur. CBM intends to 
enhance machines availability, reliability, efficiency and 
safety by reducing maintenance costs through controlled 
spare part inventories (Mechefske, 2005). In an industrial 
perspective, SKF (2012) supports that CBM aims at the 
understanding of risks and predetermination of strategic 
actions, leading to reliability and operational cost reduc-
tion. Thus, CBM is maintenance task-centered than fail-
ure-centered. Moreover, Tsang et al. (2006) suggest a 
data structure leading to decision analysis according to 
machinery condition, proposing a method for data-driven 
CBM achieving data preparation, model assessment, de-
cision making and sensitivity analysis. 
2.3 Condition Monitoring (CM) Technologies/Tools 
CBM is the latest maintenance methodology which can 
be applied through different CM technologies and tools. 
The most known CM technologies are grouped among 
vibration, noise, thermography and oil analysis monitor-
ing, which are presented next. This CM tool evaluation 
stage initiates the INCASS MRA tool investigation by 
leading to selection. 
2.3.1 Vibration Monitoring 
Vibration measurement is a key element in any predictive 
maintenance program. According to Al-Najjar (1996), 
the implementation of vibration-based maintenance of-
fers early indications of machinery malfunctions involv-
ing parameters such as rotational speed, loading fre-
quency, environmental conditions and material state. The 
most common faults detectable by vibration monitoring 
are unbalance of rotating machine parts, shaft misalign-
ment, damaged gear teeth, excess sleeve bearing wear, 
excessive gaps, defects in rolling element bearings and 
problems in the rotor and stator of electrical engines 
(Monition, 2014). 
2.3.2 Acoustic and Ultrasonic Monitoring 
One of the first symptoms of mechanical or electrical 
fault is the increase of noise generated by machinery 
parts. Most parts emit consistent sound patterns under 
normal operating conditions. These sonic signatures can 
be defined and recognized, while changes in these signa-
tures can be also identified as components begin to wear 
or deteriorate. When a leak is present in a system, an in-
crease of the ultrasound measurement is observed. The 
ultrasonic detector produces an alarm when there is a de-
viation from the normal level of background noise (com-
monly 6dB, even though it will depend on the minimum 
leak to be detected) (INCASS, 2014a). 
Ultrasonic detection is fast and cost efficient compared to 
temperature, vibration and oil analysis as it does not re-
quire sensor installation on the specified components that 
are monitored (Kim and Lee, 2009). The importance of 
ultrasonic CM is also suggested by IACS as presented in 
the Unified Requirements (UR) and Procedural Require-
ments (PR) for Ultrasonic Thickness Measurements 
(UTM) (IACS, 2004). In general, acoustic emission tech-
nology provides early indication of the onset of degraded 
strength in metal components. Some of the sources of 
acoustic emissions in metals are material cracks, plastic 
deformation development and fracturing. 
2.3.3 Thermography 
Thermography measures the temperature in any part of 
machinery and equipment so as to detect any change in 
the operating temperature thus indicating fault develop-
ment. Bagavathiappan et al. (2013) support that Infrared 
Thermography (IRT) is one of the most accepted CM 
tools. Due to the non-contact function, it is suitable for 
structural, machinery, electrical and material detection 
malfunctions. The key advantage of IRT compared to 
other CM tools is the real-time representation of pseudo-
color coded image. It can be generated either by friction, 
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bad contact or excessive wear, thus generating overheat-
ing or hot spots. 
2.3.4 Oil Analysis/Tribology 
Oil analysis is achieved through laboratory concentration 
analysis in lubricant debris analysis which deals with 
shape, size, composition of wear particles and lubricant 
degradation analysis for physical and chemical character-
istics (Jiang and Yan, 2008). Lube oil analysis does not 
only allow to obtain information about the operating con-
ditions, wear and contamination levels and equipment 
lifespan, but also enables the set-up of a condition-based 
lubricating program. The parameters measured in order 
to perform lube oil analysis are summarized as kinematic 
viscosity, content of water, lube oil acid number, particle 
count, detection of insoluble and emission spectrometry, 
absorption spectrometry and ferrography studies. 
2.3.5 Data Acquisition Tool Options 
This part of research will figure out the necessity and ap-
plicability of continuous online monitoring or periodic 
offline according to the available sensor options. Various 
sensors and devices are found available in market and 
their specifications have to be explored. As part of IN-
CASS project, the machinery condition will be assessed 
on a real-time continuous basis onboard ships. In order to 
achieve this, sensors will be installed for data collection. 
The gathered data will be used within the MRA method-
ology. Hence, it is essential to identify and classify the 
sensor types for each of the already presented CM tech-
nologies. The sensors characteristics are specified in 
terms of the output record as well as devices sensitivity, 
accuracy on specific operational conditions (i.e. temper-
ature range) and their cost. 
The most applicable CM tool is the vibration analysis. 
Hence, the sensors range includes a wide variation of 
equipment. The vibration sensors are categorized among 
displacement, velocity and acceleration. Each type de-
notes the output record. However, for particular monitor-
ing conditions, high temperature piezoelectric and triax-
ial sensors are introduced into the market. 
On the other hand, noise monitoring and thermal imaging 
consist of simpler sensor ranges compared to vibration 
monitoring. Thermal imaging involves thermal cameras 
and thermometers. Whereas, acoustic emissions are rec-
orded using ultrasonic hand-held equipment or online in-
stalled ultrasonic sensors and portable decibel meters. 
3. Suggested MRA Methodology 
INCASS Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) methodology 
is developed in order to be applied on three different mer-
chant ship types. The three ship types are tanker, bulk 
carrier and container ship. Hence, the MRA methodology 
is flexible to be adjusted in order to fulfill all require-
ments and specifications that each ship type. In this sec-
tion, the MRA methodology will be presented by demon-
strating input data flows and MRA process diagram. 
3.1 Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) Methodology 
In this section, the MRA methodology is presented. The 
data flow is demonstrated as well as the selected data pro-
cessing and modelling. The graphical demonstration of 
machinery and equipment modelling and analysis data 
flow is displayed in Fig. 1. It consists of three stages, the 
data acquisition and processing, the reliability model and 
the Decision Support System (DSS). All INCASS MRA 
and DSS development takes place in Java Object Ori-
ented Programming (OOP) language. 
 
Fig. 1: Machinery & equipment modelling & analysis data flow
The first stage of the MRA methodology gathers data and 
processes them. Data are categorized among historical, 
expert and real time monitoring. In Fig. 1 it is shown as 
raw data (unprocessed information collected from pro-
vided source i.e. experts and onboard sensors), that are 
transformed to data inputs for the MRA methodology. 
The collected data are classified in component, sub-sys-
tem and main system levels. 
All gained information is stored in the database utilizing 
text (.txt) files. This format file is selected as files are 
small in size that can be transferred from onboard to on-
shore by requiring low amount of data. The following 
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phase involves the real monitoring data/signal pro-
cessing. At this phase, signals are filtered and unneces-
sary information gathered from the environment of oper-
ation is removed. The following critical phase is the 
transformation of physical sensorial measurements to re-
liability inputs. 
In Stage 2 Reliability Model, the processed reliability 
input data from the database are introduced. The risk and 
reliability model employs a network arrangement similar 
to the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). This selection 
allows the probabilistic and mathematical modelling by 
considering actual functional relations and system/sub-
system/component interdependencies. 
The third stage of the INCASS model implements Deci-
sion Support System (DSS) aspects. The DSS methodol-
ogy is divided into two sections. The first one is utilized 
for local (onboard) and short term decision making, 
whereas the second one is used onshore (global) for 
longer term predictions and decision features. 
The INCASS methodology so far demonstrates the pro-
cedures on the data flow level. Hence, it presents the 
analysis from an input manipulation perspective. In the 
following figure (Fig. 2), the analysis takes place on the 
specific MRA process and modelling level. 
 
Fig. 2: Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) process diagram
As it can be seen, INCASS project introduces two main 
tools the MRA and DSS. On the data flow level, the de-
scription incorporates data manipulation from the data 
gathering phase up to decision making. On the other 
hand, MRA involves the risk and reliability analysis and 
processes. At the process level, various methods are em-
ployed for the condition and failure diagnostics as well 
as signal pattern recognition of the received and pre-pro-
cessed data inputs. The filtered/processed data are trans-
formed into component reliability inputs such as failure 
rates (Ȝ), Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and 
Probability of Failure (PoF). 
Lastly, the INCASS MRA model aims to predict the fu-
ture condition of the under investigation ship machinery 
and equipment. This prognostic feature tends to forecast 
the failure occurrence (failure modes and events), the 
time that this failure will take place as well as the com-
ponents, sub-systems and systems that will be affected. 
4. Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) Case Study 
After exploring in the previous sections the latest CBM 
methodology and the most applicable CM technologies, 
the MRA methodology was presented focusing on as-
pects that discovered in literature as well as innovations 
that will be implemented. This section aims to classify 
and select ship machinery and equipment that MRA 
methodology will be applied on. Furthermore, the IN-
CASS stakeholders requirements for the machinery and 
equipment selection are considered and presented. Addi-
tionally, the MRAs input data type classification will be 
demonstrated. Lastly, a MRA case study is developed for 
marine diesel engines by applying the risk and reliability 
model as developed in the MRA methodology. 
4.1 Machinery and Equipment Categorization and Se-
lection 
First of all, the machinery and equipment classification 
and selection takes place for three ship types. MRA is de-
veloped for tanker, bulk carrier and container ship. 
On the initial level of machinery and equipment catego-
rization, they are classified among operational, safety and 
cargo systems. From this perspective, operational sys-
tems include mechanical systems and main equipment, 
piping and electrical systems. These are followed by 
onboard safety systems, which consist of electrical emer-
gency systems. In addition, they are considered the cargo 
systems that refer to the tanker ships cargo pumps. 
Furthermore, additional systems such as the Navigation 
and the Fire Fighting and safety equipment system were 
initially examined together with the Operational and 
Safety systems. However, it was decided to focus on ma-
chinery that are essential for the operation of each ship 
type. 
The initial classification of the criticality level of the 
machinery systems and equipment was based on industry 
best practices and standards as well as on the operating/ 
running hours of such systems on board ships. For all 
three ship types, these critical selected main systems can 
be classified among the Main Engine (M/E), Turbo-
chargers (T/C), selected critical pumps, heat exchangers, 
boilers, purifiers, coolers and the steering gear system. 
As INCASS MRA methodology is developed, it will be 
validated on the three already mentioned ship types. 
Thus, it is important to highlight that the main selected 
systems are common among the ship types. However, in 
the case of tanker ship, they are also considered the steam 
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powered cargo pumps. 
4.2 INCASS Stakeholders Requirements 
INCASS project consortium consists of a number of part-
ners including Universities, Classification Societies as 
well as ship operators, managers, owners and service pro-
viders. Hence, CM requirements vary among the project 
stakeholders. Due to different CM necessities, the project 
members requirements are assessed leading to the final 
machinery and equipment selection (INCASS, 2014b). 
At first, the classification societies concerns, participat-
ing in INCASS project, are examined. The role of Clas-
sification Societies is to check that safety standards of 
ships are met throughout surveys, inspections, tests and 
controls. On the other hand, ship operators, managers, 
owners and service providers support that major machin-
ery breakdown leads to major/minor repair cost as well 
as increasing ship systems downtime. The reasons for 
monitoring and collecting information on ships from 
their viewpoint are related to environmental protection, 
safety of personnel onboard, compliance, class statutory 
requirements and reduction of business risk and cost. 
As it can be summarized from the INCASS stakeholders 
requirements, the Classification Societies are mostly fo-
cused on the ships functionality ensuring safety. 
Whereas, ship operators, managers, owners and service 
providers are focused on ships operation and availability 
ensuring business efficiency and safety. 
INCASS research intends to consider machinery and 
equipment for CM that all project stakeholders consider 
as functionally critical. The final systems that project 
members agreed on their operational importance ensur-
ing all considered requirements are summarized as the 
Main Engine (M/E), Turbochargers (T/C), critical se-
lected pumps (including steam powered tanker ship cargo 
pumps) and steering gear system. 
4.3 Data Classification and Collection 
MRA methodology tackles the ship machinery and 
equipment CM by gathering different input data from all 
three ship types (i.e. tanker, bulk carrier, container ship) 
that are considered within this research study. Failure in-
spection and maintenance data will be collected includ-
ing input from all stakeholders. The data that will be used 
will originate from historical, experts and real time mon-
itoring data that will be gathered from installed sensors 
onboard ships. 
Firstly, historical data consist of inspection and mainte-
nance intervals, major overhauling and unexpected 
maintenance actions as well as preventive maintenance 
data in the form of Plant Maintenance Systems (PMS). 
On the other hand, expert data collected consist of vari-
ous types of failures and their consequences, classifica-
tion societies reports as well as inspection findings. The 
expert data will be used in conjunction with the historical 
and system-gathered data to assess the risk and safety at 
the machinery component and system level. The histori-
cal and expert data can be described as processed data, 
because they include inputs from professionals and 
knowledge from past operational conditions. 
On the contrast, the third and critical data group is the 
real time monitoring data type corresponding to the 
onboard measuring campaign for the three ship types. 
Hence, in order to gather the appropriate information 
from the considered machinery and equipment, they are 
identified the parameters that can be recorded for each 
system and sub-system independently. 
The parameters are identified for the selected machinery 
and equipment (i.e. Main Engine, Turbochargers, Pumps 
and Steering Gear System) independently. Furthermore, 
operational information per trip such as date, time, voy-
age time, ship sailing time and maneuvering time will be 
collected. In addition, ship sailing condition parameters 
will be gathered (i.e. vessel speed, direction, position 
etc.) as well as environmental parameters per day (i.e. 
weather, wind speed and direction, sea state and ambient 
temperature and pressure). 
4.4 Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) Application 
The MRA methodology will be applied on various ship 
main systems. However, as collection of historical, ex-
pert and real time monitoring data is still in progress, the 
current MRA case study is focused on the main engine 
by employing only processed historical data such as fail-
ure rates (Ȝ). This model will be expanded by including 
all considered main systems. 
The ship main engine is widely defined in literature as 
the heart of the vessel. This statement highlights the 
criticality of this system and its significance for imple-
menting a CM tool, ensuring cost efficiency, ultimate 
maintenance planning, ships performance and human, 
environmental and asset safety. These reasons enable the 
case study to be initiated for the diesel main engine. 
This section aims to present the current MRA develop-
ment through a case study. The existing probabilistic 
model involves various failures modes taken place on dif-
ferent sub-systems and components of a marine diesel en-
gine. 
The main engine is divided and assessed among six sub-
systems such as Engine Internal and External Compo-
nents, Starting, Cooling, and Lubrication and Control 
Monitoring systems. In this section, the case study will 
present, the Engine Internal and External Components 
sub-systems and their comprised components. It is de-
cided to be presented these two sub-systems as they fig-
ure the component core of the entire M/E. 
Data have been provided in the form of failure rates (Ȝ) 
per component involved. At first, the overall Ȝ is calcu-
lated in percentages for each component considered in-
dependently for the pre-defined failure scenarios that 
may occur on these components. In the next stage, the 
probability of occurrence of the involved failure types on 
each selected component is calculated. These manually 
prepared data are stored in notepad (.txt) files and pro-
cessed via an automated coded procedure in Java pro-
gramming language. 
However, sensorial 'raw' collected data will be consid-
ered in future programming stages. Nevertheless, the 
loading and reading phase of the prepared text (notepad) 
files pursues to simulate the final process of user and sys-
tem interaction supplying data collected from online and 
offline sensors while loaded on the proposed model for 
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initiation of the CM process in a raw format. 
Consideration of ship Main 
Systems/Sub-systems/ 
Components
Consideration of Failure Types
Input Consideration of Failure 
Rates per Component & Failure 
Cause
Output Representation to User of 
PoF (%) per Component/
Sub-system/Main System
 
Fig. 3: MRA Study Stages 
Fig. 3 presents the stages accomplished into MRA pro-
gress from data collection until results are displayed to 
user. Initially, the main system, sub-systems and compo-
nents are specified. Data are compiled from OREDA da-
tabase. Whereas, manual data preparation takes place by 
developing static failure rates on component level out of 
the provided overall failure mode occurrence. Automated 
computation calculations are managed for individual 
components, overall sub-system and final the entire ma-
rine diesel engine. The results present Probability of 
Working and Failing (PoW and PoF respectively) states 
for component, sub-system and main system levels. 
For the Risk & Reliability Analysis stage the Bayes 
Theorem is implemented (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). 
The various probabilities are represented by employing 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG), where each considered 
probability is presented with a node and its functional re-
lation with any other node using directed arrows (Taheri 
et al., 2014). This type of DAG in the case of Bayes The-
orem is defined as Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). A 
typical example of a BBN display is shown in Fig. 4, 
where the main diesel engine system and related compo-
nents are linked with the considered events (failure types) 
(Dikis et al., 2014). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Main Diesel Engine Components MRA Model
The Bayes Theorem can be defined as probabilistic 
graphical model involving conditional dependencies ar-
ranged into DAG and it is expressed in Equation 1 
(Bedford and Cooke, 2001): 
 ࡼሺ࡭ȁ࡮ሻ ൌ ࡼሺ࡮ȁ࡭ሻ כ ࡼሺ࡭ሻࡼሺ࡮ሻ  (1) 
Where P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of events A 
and B, while A given B and B given A are conditional 
probabilities. 
A part of the M/E system arrangement is presented in Fig. 
4. Firstly, two of the major M/E sub-systems, the Engine 
Internal Components and Engine External, are demon-
strated with nodes. The next level of nodes includes the 
Engine Internal Components involving items attached to 
the M/E block as radial bearings, cylinders, injections, 
exhaust and pistons. Whereas the Engine External Com-
ponents consists of components such as fuel pump, fuel 
filter, air inlet and shaft. 
The highest level of nodes in Fig. 4 presents failure types 
for the components as defined for the Engine Internal and 
External sub-systems. These failure breakdowns are 
listed among External Leakage Utility, Failure to Start, 
Internal Leakage, Minor In-Service Problems (non-spec-
ified from source), Structural Deficiency, Overhearing, 
Noise, Erratic Output, External Leakage of Fuel and Vi-
bration. This model/node arrangement has been validated 
through experts (INCASS partners and Advisory Board 
members) and by utilizing the connections of the failure 
modes with the components from the observed input fail-
ure rates records as received from the data source. 
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 ࡼ૚ ൌ ൜࢝ǣ૚૙૙ࢌǣ૙Ǣ  
 ࡼ૛ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ࢌǣࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ Ǣ  
 ࡼ૜ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ࢌǣࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ Ǣ  
 ࡼ૝ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െ ሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ሻࢌǣሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ሻǢ  
 ࡼ૞ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െࢌ࢚ࢌ૝ࢌǣࢌ࢚ࢌ૝ Ǣ  
 ࡼ૟ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െ ሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻࢌǣሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻǢ  
 ࡼૠ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െ ሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻࢌǣሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻǢ  
 ࡼૡ ൌ ቊ࢝ǣ૚૙૙ െ ሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻࢌǣሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ሻǢ  
   
 ࡼ࢓ ൌ ሺࢌ࢚ࢌ૚ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૛ כ ࢌ࢚ࢌ૜ כ ǥכࢌ࢚ࢌ࢑ሻ (2) 
 
While, each component of the main engine is linked with 
a certain number of failure types (observed input data) 
that varies among components, a generic form expressing 
the failure case scenarios is presented in Equation 2. In 
this expression, P denotes the probability of survival for 
different failure case scenarios, where w shows the per-
centage of working probability, while f the remaining 
percentage of failing. As ft is indicated the failure type 
(i.e. noise, vibration, overheating etc.) and its subscript f 
is the probability of failure of break down scenarios. 
Hence, P1 denotes the probability of working (w) and 
failing (f) while no failures take place. P2 denotes the 
probability of working and failing while one failure type 
takes place (ftf1) and P3 for a different failure type (ftf2). 
Whereas, P4 demonstrates the probability of a compo-
nent to work or fail while both failure types (ftf1 and ftf2) 
occur. Equation 2 provides a generic form of this pattern 
by involving more failure modes for the components that 
require utilization of more than two failure types. 
 ࡼሺࢉ࢕࢓࢖ሻ ൌ෍ሺ෍ࡼሺࢌ࢚ࢌሺ࢏ሻǡ ࢌ࢚ࢌሺ࢐ሻሻሻ࢑࢏ୀ૚࢓࢐ୀ૚  (3) 
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Equation 3 presents the generic expression of the overall 
probability of component, including the summation of all 
possible break down scenarios (m: total amount of failure 
scenarios) and the summation of all considered failure 
types (k: total amount of failure types) as the latter pre-
sented in Figure 2. In addition the relation of m and k is 
presented in Equation 4. 
5. Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) Results 
The demonstrated results are performed through static 
probabilistic risk assessment modelling. The entire un-
dertaken case study examines the probability of survival 
of the main engine and specified sub-systems and com-
ponents. This case study presented that the Engine Inter-
nal and External Components are the most critical sub-
systems involved in this system as they performed the 
highest PoF. Furthermore, the generic formulation of the 
failure case scenarios for the defined failure types per in-
volved component is presented as shown in Equations 2 
and 3. Table 1 presents the M/E and overall sub-system 
PoW and PoF states. 
In Table 1, PoW (%) demonstrates the probability of 
working state, while PoF (%) denotes the probability of 
failing state. Overall the presented results show the PoW 
percentages of all considered sub-systems such as Lubri-
cation, Engine Internal and External, Starting, Control 
and Monitoring and Cooling systems as well as the entire 
performance of the M/E. 
Table 1: Main Engine and Sub-System PoW and PoF 
System PoW (%) PoF (%) 
Overall Main Engine 99.4126 0.5874 
Lubrication System 99.9437 0.0563 
Engine Internal Comp. 98.2491 1.7509 
Engine External Comp. 99.4081 0.5919 
Starting System 99.7152 0.2848 
Control & Monitoring 99.8119 0.1881 
Cooling System 99.4361 0.5639 
 
Table 1 shows that the overall system has probability to 
work approximately 99.41% (Overall Main Engine). 
Hence, the probability the M/E to fail is approximately 
0.59%. This failure rate presents the likelihood of failing 
in case the M/E is considered as one system. Further-
more, this presented reliability performance incorporates 
inputs from all considered sub-systems, components, 
failure modes and any mathematically probable failure 
case scenario. 
However, in order to expand systems PRA, the M/E is 
separated in six sub-systems and each of these is assessed 
independently as well. The PoF for these sub-systems is 
shown as 0.0563% for the Lubrication, 1.7509% and 
0.5919% for the Engine Internal and External Compo-
nents respectively, 0.2848% for the Starting, 0.1881% for 
the Control and Monitoring and 0.5639% for the Cooling 
system. Summarizing, the highest failure probability is 
associated with sub-systems such as the Engine and In-
ternal and External Components. In other words, the cal-
culated outcome provides indication for specific sub-sys-
tems that present the highest risk for failure. From prac-
tical viewpoint, the need for operational efficiency is 
highlighted for the sub-systems with lowest reliability 
performance (or highest likelihood to fail). 
Moreover, the MRA development involves the reliability 
analysis on component level. This assessment will allow 
to figure out the reliability performance within each sub-
system for the involved components. Hence, Table 2 pro-
vides the reliability performance of the M/E components. 
Table 2 demonstrates PoW and PoF on component level. 
The results show that the most unreliable components are 
the Piping performing PoF=4.29%, Valves (4.28%), In-





Table 2: Component Level Failure Probabilities 
Component PoW (%) PoF (%) 
Air Inlet  97.8249 2.1751 
Control Unit 99.5848 0.4152 
Cooler 99.4318 0.5682 
Cylinders 99.6161 0.3839 
Exhaust 98.6634 1.3366 
Fuel Filter 98.7409 1.2591 
Fuel Pump 98.4747 1.5253 
Injections 96.1086 3.8914 
Level Instrument 98.1840 1.8160 
Oil 98.7636 1.2364 
Piping 95.7051 4.2949 
Pistons 99.8408 0.1592 
Pressure Instrument 98.8819 1.1181 
Radial Bearings 99.9587 0.0413 
Shaft 99.8408 0.1592 
Speed Instrument 99.4481 0.5519 
Start Control 96.6883 3.3117 
Start Energy 98.7920 1.2080 
Starting Unit 98.2604 1.7396 
Temperature Instrument 98.5041 1.4959 
Valves 95.7246 4.2754 
6. MRA Discussion 
In the previous section, the MRA case study results are 
presented. The performance of the M/E is in good overall 
working condition (99.41%). Whereas, a detailed Proba-
bilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) on sub-system level in-
dicates the Engine Internal and External Component sub-
systems as the least reliable, performing 1.75% and 
0.59% likelihood of failure respectively. However, the 
Probability of Failure (PoF) for these sub-systems is low, 
indicating reliable operation. On the other hand, it is 
demonstrated the Probability of Working (PoW) and fail-
ing on component level. The outcomes show that the 
most unreliable components are the Piping performing 
PoF=4.29%, Valves (4.28%), Injections (3.9%) and the 
Start Control (3.31%). According to the existing reliabil-
ity performance, all sub-systems and components func-
tion on acceptable (reliable) levels. However, the lowest 
reliability is performed by the Engine Internal and Exter-
nal Component sub-systems. Whereas, in component 
level, the valves, injection and start control presented the 
most unreliable outcomes. In other words, these sub-sys-
tems and components are the most critical as they may 
cause failure to sub-systems or main engine system. 
Hence, an important parameter to be investigated is the 
degradation pattern and speed of deterioration. 
Comparing the overall systems performance as one sys-
tem and the overall systems in sub-system level analysis, 
it can be seen that the detailed assessment of sub-systems 
provides in depth and analytical performance results for 
the main system (i.e. main engine). In this respect, further 
detailed probabilistic risk assessment can be developed 
on component level (i.e. cylinders, pistons, bearing etc.) 
by comparing accuracy of results on sub-system level 
with component. This detailed analysis will lead to inves-
tigate the source (i.e. component) of failure, hence the in-
itiation of sub-systems degradation by specifying the 
faulty component. 
The demonstrated outcomes determine the static reliabil-
ity performance assessment on system, sub-system and 
component level for various failure modes and all math-
ematically probable failure case scenarios. This analysis 
achieves the reliability evaluation through a top-down 
modelling approach. 
In other words, a reliability model is developed that pre-
sents the main engines reliability performance by focus-
ing on the source of failure existence (component level). 
By knowing the critical and unreliability components, a 
prioritization study can be developed through which suit-
able maintenance actions can be suggested through a bot-
tom-up approach. This approach can deliver maintenance 
suggestions from component to sub-system and then to 
system level. 
Hence, by facing issues and malfunctions on the compo-
nent level and knowing the overall reliability of the main 
system, the enhancement of system availability, safety 
and reliability in operation can be achieved. 
6.1 Dynamic Machinery Risk Analysis Model 
This section aims to present the future plans for the pro-
gress of the probabilistic risk assessment model. The fol-
lowing stage of the MRA development will involve the 
creation of a dynamic probabilistic model. The notion of 
this research development is based on the concept that a 
system that functions will degrade through time. There-
fore, a dynamic CM model can capture more successfully 
than a static one the degradation behavior through time 
and set the grounds for a fully automated methodol-
ogy/tool that will monitor the systems reliability levels. 
At the same time, the systems condition depends on the 
past operational levels as well as the functional environ-
ment. Hence, inputs from historical and expert data will 
be combined with the dynamic Machinery Risk Analysis. 
Latest research demonstrates that dynamic probabilistic 
modelling is under development. For instance, Turan et 
al. (2011) propose a maintenance strategy based on criti-
cality and reliability assessment using dynamic Fault 
Tree Analysis (DFTA). 
Through research, it was found that dynamic probabilis-
tic models are categorized among discrete and continu-
ous (Fiondella and Xing, 2015). The major difference is 
focused on the detail of analysis with the observation 
time and the result density of the gained output. In the 
discrete modeling, CM measurements are collected in 
specified time intervals. The main limitation of discrete 
dynamic probabilistic modeling is the assumption that 
between two observation points the systems state re-
mains constant/unchanged. On the other hand, continu-
ous dynamic probabilistic modelling tries to achieve a 
state density under a reliability measure curve (i.e. Ȝ, 
MTBF, etc.) on which every required observation is 
measurable. In other words, continuous MRA modelling 
will achieve analysis and results extraction between two 
discrete measurements. Another research work consider-
ation is focused towards the component/sub-system and 
system interdependencies. Hence, the functional inter-
connectivities will be considered by modelling the idea 
that each functioning component affects others. Systems 
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will be treated in a holistic way and enable the prediction 
of failures or malfunctions while different systems are 
monitored. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to demonstrate the development of the 
Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) tool. MRA is a proba-
bilistic reliability and risk analysis model established 
through the work performed in INCASS (Inspection Ca-
pabilities for Enhanced Ship Safety) project. 
In this paper, the research background is presented first. 
It consists of the Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
methodology, well-known Condition Monitoring (CM) 
technologies/tools as well as data acquisition tools and 
sensor installation options. The MRA demonstration con-
tinued with the models methodology presentation as 
well as the input data flow and process diagrams. 
In the following section, the MRA application is pre-
sented through a marine diesel engine case study. The in-
vestigation and categorization of ship machinery and 
equipment for CM is demonstrated and the identification 
of required data gathering tools and methods. This sec-
tion initiated with the machinery and equipment classifi-
cation for the three under investigation ship types (i.e. 
tanker, bulk carrier, container ship). The research contin-
ued by considering the Stakeholders Requirements. Dif-
ferent industrial viewpoints and CM needs were met as 
INCASS consortium consists of different Universities, 
Classification Societies and ship operators, managers, 
owners and service providers. The main systems that 
MRA model will be applied on are decided to be the Main 
Engine (M/E), Turbocharger (T/C), critical selected 
pumps and the Steering Gear system. 
The current Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) model em-
ploys the Bayes Theorem in the application for diesel 
engines. It incorporates different sub-systems such as the 
Lubrication, Engine Internal and External Components, 
Starting, Control & Monitoring and Cooling systems as 
well as relevant components. Java programming with 
regularly occurred failure types is used, providing the 
overall reliability performance of the pre-defined sub-
systems as well as the entire Main Engine (M/E) system. 
In conclusion, it is essential to highlight that research fu-
ture considerations include dynamic Machinery Risk 
Analysis (MRA) modelling. In this case, dynamic failure 
rate variation will be considered through time aiming to 
assess the systems reliability performance into a contin-
uous manner. Furthermore, it is also considered the as-
sessment of systems, sub-systems and components from 
a holistic viewpoint. Thus, functional interdependencies 
will be taken into account, involving chain degradation 
reaction behavior through time from the various units that 
the MRA model consists. 
In addition to dynamic probabilistic modelling, a sensi-
tivity analysis will be taken place through which the net-
work probabilistic parameters will be tested under vari-
ous adjustments and functional conditions. The sensitiv-
ity analysis will provide valuable inputs especially in IN-
CASS MRA methodology where de-noising and signal 
recognition tools will be introduced. Lastly, an important 
implementation is the consideration of more systems in 
the MRA application than only the main engine which 
will allow to outline a wider and in depth reliability per-
formance outcome. 
6. Acknowledgements 
This project has received research funding from the Eu-
ropean Unions Seventh Framework Programme under 
grant agreement no 605200. This publication reflects 
only the authors views and European Union is not liable 
for any use that may be made of the information con-
tained herein. 
References 
ABBASSI, R., KHAN, F., GARANIYA, V., CHAI, S., 
CHIN, C. & HOSSAIN, K. A. 2015. An 
Integrated Method for Human Error Probability 
Assessment during the Maintenance of 
Offshore Facilities. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection. 
AL-NAJJAR, B. 1996. Total quality maintenance: An 
approach for continuous reduction in costs of 
quality products. Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering, 2, 4-20. 
ASADZADEH, S. M. & AZADEH, A. 2014. An 
integrated systemic model for optimization of 
condition-based maintenance with human 
error. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 
124, 117-131. 
BAGAVATHIAPPAN, S., LAHIRI, B. B., 
SARAVANAN, T., PHILIP, J. & 
JAYAKUMAR, T. 2013. Infrared 
thermography for condition monitoring  A 
review. Infrared Physics & Technology, 60, 
35-55. 
BEDFORD, T. & COOKE, R. 2001. Probabilistic Risk 
Analysis: Foundations and Methods, 
Cambridge University Press. 
DHILLON, B. S. & LIU, Y. 2006. Human error in 
maintenance: a review. Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering, 12, 21-36. 
DIKIS, K., LAZAKIS, I. & TURAN, O. Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment of Condition Monitoring of 
Marine Diesel Engines.  International 
Conference on Maritime Technology, 7-9 July 
2014 2014 Glasgow, UK. University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
FIONDELLA, L. & XING, L. 2015. Discrete and 
continuous reliability models for systems with 
identically distributed correlated components. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 133, 
1-10. 
IACS 2004. Procedural Requirements for Thickness 
Measurements. United Kingdom. 
INCASS 2014a. Deliverable D4.1 Machinery and 
equipment requirement specification. INCASS - 
Inspection Capabilities for Enhanced Ship 
Safety. EC FP7 Project. 
INCASS 2014b. Deliverable D4.2 Stakeholders data 
requirements. INCASS - Inspection 
 10
Capabilities for Enhanced Ship Safety. EC FP7 
Project. 
JIANG, R. & YAN, X. 2008. Condition Monitoring of 
Diesel Engines. Complex System Maintenance 
Handbook. Springer London. 
KIM, J. & LEE, M. 2009. Real-time diagnostic system 
using acoustic emission for a cylinder liner in a 
large two-stroke diesel engine. International 
Journal of Precision Engineering and 
Manufacturing, 10, 51-58. 
KUMAMOTO, H. & HENLEY, E. J. 1996. 
Probabilistic risk assessment and management 
for engineers and scientists, IEEE Press. 
LAZAKIS, I., TURAN, O. & AKSU, S. 2010. 
Increasing ship operational reliability through 
the implementation of a holistic maintenance 
management strategy. Ships and Offshore 
Structures, 5, 337-357. 
MADU, C. N. 2000. Competing through maintenance 
strategies. International Journal of Quality & 
Reliability Management, 17, 937-949. 
MECHEFSKE, C. K. 2005. Machine Condition 
Monitoring and Fault Diagnosis, Boca Raton, 
Florida, USA, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
MOBLEY, K., HIGGINS, L. & WIKOFF, D. 2008. 
Maintenance Engineering Handbook, Mcgraw-
hill. 
MONITION, V. A. 2014. Monition Vibration Analysis 
for Everyone [Online]. Nottinghamshire, 
United Kingdom. Available: 
http://www.vibrationanalysis.co.uk/index.html 
[Accessed 26th of January 2014]. 
NOROOZI, A., KHAKZAD, N., KHAN, F., 
MACKINNON, S. & ABBASSI, R. 2013. The 
role of human error in risk analysis: 
Application to pre- and post-maintenance 
procedures of process facilities. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 119, 251-258. 
SKF 2012. Condition-based maintenance must be set up 
correctly. Marine Propulsion - Ship lifecyle 
management. 
TAHERI, A., LAZAKIS, I. & TURAN, O. Integration 
of Business and Technical Aspects of 
Reliability and Maintenance.  International 
Conference on Maritime Technology, 7-9 July 
2014 2014 Glasgow, UK. University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
TSANG, A. H. C., YEUNG, W. K., JARDINE, A. K. S. 
& LEUNG, B. P. K. 2006. Data management 
for CBM optimization. Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering, 12, 37-51. 
TURAN, O., LAZAKIS, I., JUDAH, S. & INCECIK, A. 
2011. Investigating the reliability and 
criticality of the maintenance characteristics of 
a diving support vessel. Quality and Reliability 
Engineering International, 27, 931-946. 
 
 
